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UNCLEAR AUTHORITY, UNCLEAR FUTURES:
PREEMPTION CHALLENGES TO STATE
LEGISLATION PROVIDING IN-STATE TUITION
BENEFITS TO UNDOCUMENTED STUDENTS
PURSUING HIGHER EDUCATION
Julia R. Kim*
Exercising its federal power to regulate immigration, Congress has
responded to illegal immigration by enacting deterrent legislation that
includes provisions denying public benefits to undocumented immigrants.
One of these provisions, 8 U.S.C. § 1623, explicitly bars states from
providing postsecondary education benefits to undocumented immigrants
on the basis of in-state residency. As a consequence, undocumented young
adults—many of whom grew up and received their primary and secondary
education in the United States—are effectively barred from pursuing higher
education by their ineligibility for in-state tuition rates and financial aid.
Some states, however, have evaded the § 1623 bar by providing
undocumented students with in-state tuition rates for which eligibility is not
explicitly based on state residency.
This Note examines whether the states that choose to affirmatively
provide in-state tuition benefits to their undocumented students are
preempted from doing so by § 1623. It concludes that properly crafted
state legislation is not preempted by federal law, though the most effective
and sensible resolution to the conflicting views on this issue calls for
Congress to repeal § 1623 and offer deserving undocumented students a
pathway to lawful immigration status and the opportunity to pursue higher
education.
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INTRODUCTION
Congress has been attempting to control illegal immigration for decades.1
Despite these efforts, millions of undocumented immigrants have continued
to enter the United States and establish lives with their families.2 Their
children are educated in public schools and socialized into American
culture, growing up to be indistinguishable from classmates who are
citizens or otherwise lawfully present.3 Many excel in school, develop their
potential to contribute to society, and aspire to continue their education at
the postsecondary level, only to find that their unlawful immigration status,
federal laws, and a lack of financial resources prevent those dreams from
becoming reality.4
An issue for Congress has been whether undocumented children should
be provided with the opportunity to fulfill their dreams of higher
education.5 This debate represents the complex struggle between state
regulation of educational opportunities and the need to deal with illegal
immigration as a federal matter.6 The debate has manifested itself in
Congress’s attempts to pass the Development, Relief, and Education for
Alien Minors (DREAM) Act,7 which would provide eligible undocumented
young adults with a gateway to a postsecondary education and lawful
immigration status in the United States.8 This legislation arose out of
recognition of these young adults’ potential to contribute back to American
society.9

1. See HELENE HAYES, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE UNDOCUMENTED:
AMBIVALENT LAWS, FURTIVE LIVES 4 (2001).
2. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., UNAUTHORIZED
IMMIGRANT POPULATION: NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS, 2010, at 9 (2010), available at
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/133.pdf.
3. See WILLIAM PEREZ, WE ARE AMERICANS: UNDOCUMENTED STUDENTS PURSUING
THE AMERICAN DREAM xii (2009).
4. See id. at xii–xiii.
5. See 147 CONG. REC. 15361 (2001) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
6. See Michael A. Olivas, Storytelling Out Of School: Undocumented College
Residency, Race, and Reaction, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1019, 1021–25 (1995).
7. DREAM Act, S. 1291, 107th Cong. (2001).
8. See Id.
9. See ORRIN HATCH, AMENDING THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION REFORM ACT OF 1996, S.
REP. NO. 108-224, at 2 (2004).
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Though Congress has attempted several times to pass the DREAM Act, it
has failed to become law.10 In response, many states have independently
opened up postsecondary educational opportunities for undocumented
students by offering them the benefit of in-state tuition rates.11 In several
instances, such state legislation has been challenged in the courts as being
preempted by federal laws that proscribe the provision of public benefits to
undocumented immigrants.12
This Note examines whether state laws providing in-state tuition rates to
undocumented students are preempted by federal law in 8 U.S.C. § 1621
and § 1623, which prohibit the provision of public benefits, including
postsecondary education benefits, to undocumented immigrants. Part I of
this Note provides background on the regulation of undocumented
immigration, and then explores federal and state laws and case law relating
to the postsecondary education rights of undocumented students. Part I also
looks at the standing and preemption doctrines that pervade the challenges
brought in court against those state statutes that allow postsecondary
education benefits to reach undocumented immigrants.
Part II then focuses on the arguments for whether § 1621 and § 1623
preempt state laws providing in-state tuition rates to undocumented
immigrants. This Note explores the standing and preemption issues
primarily through the lens of the litigation in Day v. Bond13 and Martinez v.
Regents of the University of California,14 which both challenged such state
laws.
Finally, Part III of this Note argues that federal law does not fully bar
states from providing undocumented students with postsecondary education
benefits, but that, nevertheless, the best resolution to the conflict would
come through federal legislation providing undocumented students with
better access to a postsecondary education and lawful immigration status in
the United States.
I. FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATORY POWERS REGARDING
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION AND POSTSECONDARY
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNDOCUMENTED STUDENTS:
CURRENT STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROVERSIES
Part I of this Note provides background on undocumented immigrant
students in the United States and the federal and state powers to regulate
matters concerning them, specifically in the area of postsecondary
10. See Michael A. Olivas, The Political Economy of the DREAM Act and the
Legislative Process: A Case Study of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 55 WAYNE L.
REV. 1757, 1793–1802 (2009).
11. Undocumented Student Tuition: State Action, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Oct. 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=12846.
12. See generally Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2007); Immigration Reform
Coal. of Tex. v. Texas, 706 F. Supp. 2d 760 (S.D. Tex. 2010); Martinez v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855 (Cal. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2961 (2011).
13. 500 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2007).
14. 241 P.3d 855 (Cal. 2010).
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education benefits. To that end, Part I.A discusses the growth of the
undocumented immigrant population and Congress’s efforts to deter illegal
immigration.
Part I.B then explores the education rights of the
undocumented as presented in Supreme Court case law.
Next, Part I.C examines Congress’s attempts to address the issue of
undocumented students’ access to a postsecondary education through the
DREAM Act, which would repeal federal law proscribing the provision of
postsecondary education benefits to undocumented immigrants. Part I.D
then discusses various approaches at the state level to providing
postsecondary education opportunities by offering in-state tuition rates to
undocumented students.
Parts I.E and I.F then survey the issues relating to preemption challenges
brought against state laws providing in-state tuition rates to undocumented
students. Part I.E focuses on the standing challenges that have blocked
such preemption challenges from being fully litigated. Part I.F then
considers the preemption doctrine that has developed relating to federal
immigration law in order to lay the foundation for its application to state
laws providing undocumented students with in-state tuition rate benefits.
A. Federal Regulation of Immigration and the
Undocumented Immigrant Population
The Constitution does not expressly authorize the federal government to
regulate immigration.15 Since the nineteenth century, however, the
Supreme Court has considered immigration regulation to be an implied
power, existing “as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the
Constitution” to the federal government.16 The Supreme Court has thus
consistently held that the regulation of immigration is a federal power.17
The federal statutory scheme regulating immigration classifies all
lawfully admitted aliens as either immigrants or nonimmigrants.18
Unlawfully present aliens are those who have entered the United States
without valid entry or immigration visas, overstayed their nonimmigrant

15. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE
LAW AND POLICY 116 (5th ed. 2009).
16. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609
(1889) (upholding the plenary power of Congress to exclude noncitizens from the United
States); see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 731 (1893) (upholding
Congress’s plenary power to deport noncitizens from the United States, stating that “[t]he
question whether, and upon what conditions, these aliens shall be permitted to remain within
the United States being one to be determined by the political departments of the government,
the judicial department cannot properly express an opinion upon the wisdom, the policy or
the justice of the measures enacted by Congress in the exercise of the powers confided to it
by the Constitution over this subject”).
17. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354–55 (1976) (“Power to regulate immigration
is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.” (citing Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 748; Chy
Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 276 (1876); Henderson v. Mayor of N.Y., 92 U.S. 259, 272–
73 (1876); Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 483 (1849))).
18. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2006); LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 15, at 250.
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visas, or violated the terms of their admission in some way.19 Due to the
undocumented nature of their presence, having exact statistics on
undocumented immigrants20 in the United States proves difficult.
Nevertheless, various studies give a sense as to the size and growth of the
undocumented population.
Concerns with the size of the undocumented immigrant population in the
United States began to develop in the mid-to-late 1970s, when it reached an
estimated size of one million people.21 The population continued to grow
throughout the early to mid-1980s at a steady rate of approximately 200,000
people per year.22 In 1986, after the undocumented population had grown
to an estimated 2.5–3.5 million,23 Congress responded with the Immigration
Reform and Control Act (IRCA).24 Congress designed IRCA to lay a basis
for effective immigration law enforcement going forward by first
“eliminating a voiceless, rightless permanent underclass.”25 To that end,
IRCA granted amnesty to certain undocumented immigrants already living
in the country by giving them lawful immigration status,26 and placed
sanctions on employers who hired undocumented immigrants.27
Despite Congress’s efforts, it soon became clear that IRCA had failed to
stop illegal immigration, as the undocumented population continued to
grow steadily at rates of over 200,000 people per year.28 The Immigration
and Nationalization Service (INS) estimated that by 1996, there were
approximately five million undocumented immigrants living in the United
States, with over half (2.7 million) from Mexico.29 Given the magnitude of
the unauthorized immigrant population, Congress took stronger measures to
restrict undocumented immigration by enacting the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).30 IIRIRA

19. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 15, at 1140; see also JEFFREY S. PASSEL,
PEW HISPANIC CNTR., THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT
POPULATION IN THE U.S.: ESTIMATES BASED ON THE MARCH 2005 CURRENT POPULATION
SURVEY 16 (2006), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf (“Virtually all
unauthorized [immigrants] fall into two categories: those who overstayed their visas or
those classified by the government as ‘entries without inspection,’ or EWIs.”).
20. This Note refers to unauthorized aliens using the term “undocumented immigrants”
instead of the statutory term “illegal aliens,” which carries a pejorative connation. See
LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 15, at 1140–41.
21. Jeffrey S. Passel, Undocumented Immigration to the United States: Numbers,
Trends, and Characteristics, in ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IN AMERICA: A REFERENCE
HANDBOOK 27, 32 (David W. Haines & Karen E. Rosenblum eds., 1999).
22. Id. at 33.
23. Id. at 32 (estimate based on the 1980 Census).
24. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
25. Hayes, supra note 1, at 4.
26. See id.; see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1160, 1187, 1188, 1255(a) (2006).
27. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2006).
28. Passel, supra note 21, at 37.
29. Id.
30. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.).
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aimed “to improve deterrence of illegal immigration to the United States.”31
It worked in conjunction with the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which Congress had enacted
six weeks prior to IIRIRA,32 to discourage undocumented immigration by
“dramatically chang[ing] the landscape [of federal benefits available to
undocumented immigrants] in many areas of health and welfare.”33 Section
411 of PRWORA, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a), specifically denied public
benefits to noncitizens, including permanent residents, by stating that “an
alien . . . is not eligible for any State or local public benefit.”34 IIRIRA
imposed other specific restrictions, such as section 505, codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1623, which specifically proscribes the availability of postsecondary
education benefits to unauthorized immigrants.35
Nevertheless, the deterrent efforts behind PRWORA and IIRIRA proved
ineffective, as evidenced by a study on behalf of the Pew Hispanic Center
showing that the undocumented immigration population had grown to 11.1
million people by 2005, and that about two-thirds of them had arrived in the
ten years since 1996.36 Most came from Mexico, numbering at 6.2 million,
or 56 percent of the unauthorized population.37 Out of the total 11.1
million, 1.8 million, or 16 percent, were children.38
The size of the undocumented immigrant population has appeared to
remain relatively stable in recent years after a slight decline from its peak at
12 million in 2007.39 This decline has been attributed to the decrease in the
influx of undocumented immigrants from Mexico.40 In 2009, the Center for
Immigration Studies (CIS) estimated that there were 10.8 million
unauthorized immigrants present in the United States.41 Within these 10.8
million, “roughly two-thirds of all adult illegal aliens are young, less31. H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 1 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
32. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 104193, §§ 400–51, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260–76 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8 and 42
U.S.C.).
33. Olivas, supra note 10, at 1763.
34. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (2006).
35. Id. § 1623. The text of § 1623 reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an alien who is not lawfully present in
the United States shall not be eligible on the basis of residence within a State (or a
political subdivision) for any postsecondary education benefit unless a citizen or
national of the United States is eligible for such a benefit (in no less an amount,
duration, and scope) without regard to whether the citizen or national is such a
resident.
Id.
36. Passel, supra note 19, at 1–2.
37. Id. at 4 (noting that 22 percent came from the rest of Latin America, 13 percent from
Asia, 6 percent from Europe and Canada, and the remaining 3 percent from Africa and other
countries).
38. Id. at 8.
39. Passel & Cohn, supra note 2, at 9.
40. See id. at 10.
41. Steven A. Camarota & Karen Jensenius, A Shifting Tide: Recent Trends in the
Illegal Immigrant Population, CENTER FOR IMMIGR. STUD. 1 (July 2009), http://www.cis.org/
articles/2009/shiftingtide.pdf.
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educated, Hispanic immigrants.”42 According to a more recent study
released by the Pew Hispanic Center in February 2011, of the estimated
11.2 million undocumented immigrants, approximately 1 million are
children.43
These statistics make clear that there is, and will continue to be for some
time, a significant number of undocumented immigrants who would benefit
from access to a postsecondary education. There are currently an estimated
700,000 undocumented immigrants under the age of 30 who have graduated
from high school in the United States, as well as an additional 700,000
currently under the age of 18 and enrolled in school.44 Many of these
undocumented students have spent almost their whole lives in the United
States, living as Americans, indistinguishable from their citizen peers.45
However, for those undocumented students with the desire to further their
education at postsecondary institutions, there are usually insurmountable
financial barriers due to the combination of high tuition costs and
ineligibility for governmental grant, loan, and work assistance programs.46
In addition, most states do not allow resident undocumented students to
receive in-state tuition rates.47 As a result, estimates of the number of
undocumented students who have lived in the United States for five years
or longer, graduated from a U.S. high school, and enrolled in a U.S. college
in a given year number only in the thousands.48 Immigration status clearly
serves as an effective bar to the pursuit of a higher education for many longterm undocumented young adults.49
B. Educational Rights of Undocumented Immigrants
Since Brown v. Board of Education,50 the Supreme Court has affirmed a
right to equal educational opportunities and the significant role that
education plays in modern society. While Brown addressed the segregation
of children in so-called separate-but-equal public schools,51 the Court’s
42. Id. at 3. Defining “young, less-educated, Hispanic immigrants” as “Hispanic
immigrants 18–40 years of age with no more than a high school education living in the
United States.” Id. More precisely, CIS estimates that three-fourths of the 6,703,000 young,
less-educated, foreign-born Hispanic population present in the United States in 2009 were
unlawfully present. Id. at 3–4.
43. Passel & Cohn, supra note 2, at 13.
44. Up to 1.4 Million Unauthorized Immigrants Could Benefit from New Deportation
Policy, PEW HISPANIC CENTER (June 15, 2012), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/06/15/upto-1-4-million-unauthorized-immigrants-could-benefit-from-new-deportation-policy/.
45. See Perez, supra note 3, at xii.
46. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 15, at 1210.
47. See id.
48. See Jeffrey S. Passel, URBAN INST., Further Demographic Information Relating to
the DREAM Act, CENTER HUM. RTS. & CONST. L., 2 (Oct. 21, 2003), http://www.national
immigrationreform.org/proposed/DREAM/UrbanInstituteDREAM.pdf (estimating that in
2003, college enrollment amounted to about 7,000–13,000 undocumented immigrants who
have lived in the U.S. for five years or longer and have graduated from U.S. high schools).
49. See Perez, supra note 3, at xii.
50. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
51. See id. at 493.
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holding recognized the supreme importance of education in preparing
children to survive and succeed in modern society.52 The Court also found
significant that segregated children would develop “a feeling of inferiority
as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in
a way unlikely ever to be undone.”53
The Court has nonetheless never taken steps toward opening access to a
postsecondary education for undocumented students. Beginning in 1973
with San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,54 the Supreme
Court held that there is no fundamental right to education. While
recognizing the “grave significance of education both to the individual and
to our society,”55 the Court held that education is not a fundamental right
explicitly or implicitly afforded protection under the Constitution.56
Interestingly, while San Antonio continued to remain good law, the Court
held six years later in Plyler v. Doe57 that states could not deprive
undocumented children of a K–12 education. At the time, Texas education
laws withheld from local school districts state funds for the education of the
children of unlawfully admitted immigrants, and they also allowed districts
to deny these children enrollment in their public schools.58 Analyzing the
Texas statute under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court first emphasized
that undocumented immigrants are persons within the state’s jurisdiction
and are thus entitled to the equal protection of its laws.59 Though declining
to classify undocumented aliens as a suspect class,60 Justice Brennan
expressed his concern that the inability to bar unlawful entry into the
country and employment of the unlawfully admitted had resulted in a
“shadow population” or underclass of undocumented aliens.61
Accordingly, the Court used a form of intermediate scrutiny62 and held that
52. See id. (“Today [education] is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.”).
53. Id. at 494.
54. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
55. Id. at 30 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
56. See id. at 35.
57. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
58. See id. at 205.
59. See id. at 210; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
60. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19 (“We reject the claim that ‘illegal aliens’ are a ‘suspect
class.’ . . . Unlike most of the classifications that we have recognized as suspect, entry into
this class . . . is the product of voluntary action. Indeed, entry into the class is itself a
crime.”).
61. Id. at 218–19 (“This situation raises the specter of a permanent caste of
undocumented resident aliens, encouraged by some to remain here as a source of cheap
labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that our society makes available to citizens and
lawful residents.”).
62. See Olivas, supra note 6, at 1041–43 (discussing Justice Brennan’s choice of
intermediate scrutiny over strict scrutiny because undocumented aliens were not a suspect
class and education was not a fundamental right, as well as his rejection of minimal
scrutiny).
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depriving undocumented children of a public education, which would
prepare them to be productive members of society, would penalize them.63
The Court held that the Texas statute did not advance any substantial state
interest,64 thus reemphasizing the Court’s recognition of the importance of
education in providing children with an opportunity for success in life.65
Moreover, the Court refused to limit the availability of a basic education for
children who were brought unlawfully to the United States by no choice of
their own, and for whom the opportunity to obtain legal status remained
unclear.66
While the Supreme Court’s decisions in Brown, Rodriguez, and Plyler do
not directly reach the issue of undocumented students’ access to a
postsecondary education, it has become difficult to ignore the issue of
whether hundreds of thousands of undocumented students who have
received their primary and secondary education in the United States as a
result of Plyler would nonetheless be barred from pursuing higher
education.67
C. The DREAM Act: A Proposed Repeal of 8 U.S.C. § 1623
The necessity of a higher education for success in society68 has been
well-recognized by those in Congress who have been working to pass the
DREAM Act.69 Senator Orrin Hatch first introduced this bill in 2001 to
effectively repeal 8 U.S.C. § 1623, the portion of federal law prohibiting
states from granting undocumented students in-state rates for tuition and
fees based on in-state residency.70
The purpose of the DREAM Act, as introduced in 2001, was to ensure
that long-term resident undocumented immigrant youths, who were brought
63. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220–21 (“[E]ducation has a fundamental role in maintaining the
fabric of our society. We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation
when select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our
social order rests.”); see also id. at 222 (“The inestimable toll of th[e] deprivation [of the
ability to read and write] on the social economic, intellectual, and psychological well-being
of the individual, and the obstacle it poses to individual achievement, make it most difficult
to reconcile the cost or the principle of a status-based denial of basic education with the
framework of equality embodied in the Equal Protection Clause.”).
64. Id. at 230.
65. See id. at 223 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
66. See id. at 230 (“[T]he record is clear that many of the undocumented children
disabled by this classification will remain in this country indefinitely, and that some will
become lawful residents or citizens of the United States. It is difficult to understand
precisely what the State hopes to achieve by promoting the creation and perpetuation of a
subclass of illiterates within our boundaries, surely adding to the problems and costs of
unemployment, welfare, and crime. It is thus clear that whatever savings might be achieved
by denying these children an education, they are wholly insubstantial in light of the costs
involved to these children, the State, and the Nation.”).
67. See Perez, supra note 3, at xii–xiii.
68. See id. at xxvi (citing Bureau of Labor Statistics data showing higher earnings to be
tied to the credentials and skills associated with a postsecondary education).
69. DREAM Act, S. 1291, 107th Cong. (2001).
70. See id.; see also supra note 35.
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to the United States through no choice of their own, would not be “left
behind” from the opportunity to attain a higher education and better their
lives.71 Senator Hatch presented the DREAM Act legislation as a way of
ensuring that, from among the 50,000 to 70,000 undocumented youths
graduating from high schools in the United States each year, those most
deserving have an opportunity to achieve the American dream.72 Senator
Hatch continued to emphasize that the DREAM Act’s function was not to
be a form of blanket amnesty for undocumented young adult immigrants.73
Rather, the legislation resolved a policy and fairness issue regarding the
innocent and hard-working undocumented immigrants who have grown up
as a part of American society and have potential to contribute value to the
nation.74 By repealing 8 U.S.C. § 162375 and leaving “[e]ach state . . . free
to determine whom it deems a resident for the purpose of determining instate tuition,” the DREAM Act would give states permission to provide
undocumented students with access to a postsecondary education.76
While the DREAM Act in its various forms over the years has enjoyed
some bipartisan support,77 it has failed to become law due to the complexity
and politics of immigration reform.78 In the most recent vote on the
DREAM Act in December 2010, the Act passed in the House 216–198, but
failed by five votes in the Senate to reach the sixty it needed to overcome a
filibuster and become law.79 Thus, the states are still left with unclear
71. 147 CONG. REC. 15361 (2001) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“This legislation,
known as the ‘DREAM Act,’ would allow children who have been brought to the United
States through no volition of their own the opportunity to fulfill their dreams, to secure a
college degree and legal status. The purpose of the DREAM Act is to ensure that we leave
no child behind, regardless of his or her legal status in the United States or their parents’
illegal status.”).
72. Id.
73. See ORRIN HATCH, AMENDING THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION REFORM ACT OF 1996, S.
REP. NO. 108-224, at 2 (2004).
74. See id. (“A great many grow up to become honest and hardworking young adults
who are loyal to our country and who strive for academic and professional excellence. It is a
mistake to lump these children together with adults who knowingly crossed our borders
illegally. Instead, the better policy is to view them as the valuable resource that they are for
our nation’s future.”).
75. See infra notes 84–85.
76. S. REP. NO. 108-224, at 4.
77. See Olivas, supra note 10, at 1793.
78. See id. at 1793–1802 (describing the failure to enact the DREAM Act of 2007, S.
2205, 110th Cong. (2007)—in large part due to the missing votes of four key senators on
record as supporting the legislation and the reluctance of other senators willing to vote for
the legislation only if it would be sure to pass—and the difficulty of passing DREAM Act
legislation where Congress and the Obama administration currently appear to be taking an
omnibus approach to immigration reform).
79. DREAM Act of 2010, H.R. 5281, 111th Cong. (2010). Without fail, the DREAM
Act was reintroduced in the Senate in May 2011 by Senator Richard Durbin. See DREAM
Act of 2011, S. 952, 112th Cong. (2011). This most recent version of the bill proposed
granting conditional permanent resident status for long-term residents who entered the
United States at the age of 15 or younger and have been continuously present, all the while
demonstrating good moral character, earning a high school diploma and admission to a
postsecondary institution in the United States. Id. at § 3. Upon acquiring a degree from a
postsecondary institution or completing at least two years in good standing for a bachelor’s
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authority as to whether and how they can regulate access to postsecondary
education benefits for undocumented students.
D. The Failure of the DREAM Act and State Regulation of Postsecondary
Educational Opportunities for Undocumented Immigrants
Though education has typically been considered an area of regulation left
to the states,80 the states’ regulatory powers over education matters
concerning undocumented immigrants were limited by Congress’s
immigration reforms in 1996.81 Not only did PRWORA specifically deny
public benefits to noncitizens,82 it also defined public benefits to include
postsecondary education benefits.83 IIRIRA section 505, codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1623, specifically proscribed the availability of postsecondary
education benefits, such as in-state tuition rates, based on residence to
unauthorized immigrants.84 Congress intended that § 1623 would make it
so that “State or local governments may not treat an ineligible alien as a
resident, if such action would treat the alien more favorably than a nonresident U.S. citizen.”85
Confusion exists, however, as to the extent of the limitation on state
powers to enact legislation granting undocumented students in-state tuition
rate benefits, as PRWORA gives the states some authority to exercise
discretion over undocumented immigrant eligibility for state and local
public benefits in 8 U.S.C. § 1621. While § 1621(a) states that
undocumented immigrants are ineligible for “any State or local public
benefit,”86 under § 1621(d)

degree or higher, or upon having served in the armed services for at least two years, the
resident would be eligible to have the conditional status lifted and made permanent. Id. at §
5.
80. See Brooke Wilkins, Should Public Education Be A Federal Fundamental Right?,
2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 261, 272.
81. See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text.
82. See 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (2006).
83. See id. § 1621(c). The statute provides:
“State or local public benefit” defined
(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), for purposes of this
subchapter the term “State or local public benefit” means—
(A) any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license
provided by an agency of a State or local government or by appropriated
funds of a State or local government; and
(B) any retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing,
postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any other
similar benefit for which payments or assistance are provided to an
individual, household, or family eligibility unit by an agency of a State or
local government or by appropriated funds of a State or local government.
Id.
84. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
85. S. REP. NO. 104-249, at 22 (1996).
86. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a). That statute provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . , an alien who is not—
(1) a qualified alien (as defined in section 1641 of this title),
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[a] State may provide that an alien who is not lawfully present in the
United States is eligible for any State or local public benefit for which
such alien would otherwise be ineligible . . . only through the enactment
of a State law after August 22, 1996, which affirmatively provides for
such eligibility.87

Within this context of the failed passage of the DREAM Act and the
conflicting messages of § 1621 and § 1623, many states have taken it upon
themselves to affirmatively provide postsecondary education benefits to
undocumented students in the form of in-state tuition rates at their public
colleges and universities. As of the writing of this Note, the states
providing undocumented students with in-state tuition rates are:
California,88 Connecticut,89 Illinois,90 Kansas,91 Maryland,92 Nebraska,93
New Mexico,94 New York,95 Rhode Island,96 Texas,97 Utah,98 and
Washington.99
As an example, Kansas’s statute affirmatively offers undocumented
students in-state tuition rates by stating that undocumented students who
attended and graduated from Kansas high schools are essentially
reclassified as residents for the purposes of tuition and fees.100 On the other
(2) a nonimmigrant under the Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C. 1101 et
seq.], or
(3) an alien who is paroled into the United States under section 212(d)(5) of such
Act [8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)] for less than one year,
is not eligible for any State or local public benefit (as defined in subsection (c) of
this section).
Id. (alterations in original).
87. Id. § 1621(d).
88. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5 (West 2012).
89. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10a-29 (2012).
90. See 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/7e-5 (2012).
91. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-731a (2011).
92. See MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 15-106.8 (LexisNexis 2011) (contingent on
referendum).
93. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 85-502 (2011).
94. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-4.6 (LexisNexis 2012).
95. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 355(2)(h)(8) (McKinney 2012).
96. See Residency Policy, R.I. BD. OF GOVERNORS FOR HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 26, 2011),
http://www.ribghe.org/residency1for2012.pdf. Rhode Island’s Board of Governors for
Higher Education implemented an in-state tuition policy for undocumented students
effective Fall 2012 without going through the state legislature. A bill is currently being held
in the state legislature for further study. See H. 7340, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2012).
97. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 54.052–.053 (West 2012).
98. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 53B-8-106 (LexisNexis 2012).
99. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.15.012 (2012).
100. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-731a (2011). The Kansas statute provides:
Certain persons without lawful immigration status deemed residents for purpose of
tuition and fees.
(a) Any individual who is enrolled or has been accepted for admission at a
postsecondary educational institution as a postsecondary student shall be deemed
to be a resident of Kansas for the purpose of tuition and fees for attendance at such
postsecondary educational institution.
(b) As used in this section:
...
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hand, California’s statute does not explicitly declare undocumented students
to be residents for the purposes of tuition and fees, but grants
undocumented students in-state tuition rates by basing eligibility on other
criteria, such as three years minimum attendance at, and graduation from, a
California high school.101 California also signed its own DREAM Act into
state law in July 2011, allowing undocumented students to receive financial
aid to attend state colleges and universities.102 The challenges to California
and Kansas state statutes that allow postsecondary education benefits to
reach undocumented students form the basis of the preemption analysis of
this Note.103
Conversely, there are also states that explicitly deny in-state tuition
benefits to undocumented students.
These states currently include
Arizona,104 Georgia,105 and Indiana, 106 which prohibit undocumented
(2) “individual” means a person who (A) has attended an accredited Kansas high
school for three or more years, (B) has either graduated from an accredited Kansas
high school or has earned a general educational development (GED) certificate
issued within Kansas, regardless of whether the person is or is not a citizen of the
United States of America; and (C) in the case of a person without lawful
immigration status, has filed with the postsecondary educational institution an
affidavit stating that the person or the person’s parents have filed an application to
legalize such person’s immigration status, or such person will file such an
application as soon as such person is eligible to do so or, in the case of a person
with a legal, nonpermanent immigration status, has filed with the postsecondary
educational institution an affidavit stating that such person has filed an application
to begin the process for citizenship of the United States or will file such
application as soon as such person is eligible to do so.
(c) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any individual who:
(1) Has a valid student visa; or
(2) at the time of enrollment, is eligible to enroll in a public postsecondary
educational institution located in another state upon payment of fees and tuition
required of residents of such state.
Id.
101. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5 (West 2012). The California statute provides in part:
(a) A student . . . who meets all of the following requirements shall be exempt
from paying nonresident tuition at the California State University and the
California Community Colleges:
(1) High school attendance in California for three or more years.
(2) Graduation from a California high school or attainment of the equivalent
thereof.
(3) Registration as an entering student at, or current enrollment at, an accredited
institution of higher education in California . . . .
(4) In the case of a person without lawful immigration status, the filing of an
affidavit with the institution of higher education stating that the student has filed
an application to legalize his or her immigration status, or will file an application
as soon as he or she is eligible to do so.
Id.
102. A.B. 130, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
103. See infra Part II.B (discussing Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2007)); Part
II.C (discussing Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855 (Cal. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2961 (2011)).
104. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-1802, 1803, 1825 (2012).
105. See GA. CODE ANN. § 20-3-66 (2012).
106. See IND. CODE. § 21-14-11-1 (2012).
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students from being classified as in-state students. Colorado takes a
different approach and does not include undocumented students in its
regulatory scheme classifying the in-state students eligible for in-state
tuition rates.107 South Carolina108 and Alabama109 go beyond denying instate tuition rates to undocumented students and explicitly bar them from
enrolling in the state’s public postsecondary institutions.
This clear divide between states’ attitudes on providing undocumented
students with opportunities for a postsecondary education highlights the
debate over whether states are preempted from providing such benefits by
federal law.
E. Standing As an Obstacle to Challenging State Laws Providing
Undocumented Students with In-State Tuition Rates
In light of the highly politicized nature of immigration law reform and
the unclear authority of states to grant postsecondary education benefits in
the form of in-state tuition to undocumented residents, several courts have
seen challenges based on § 1623 to such benefits. These challenges have
been brought on federal law preemption grounds and claims of violations of
the Fourteenth Amendment.110 Federal courts, however, have dismissed
such cases on standing grounds before even reaching the question of
preemption.111 Thus, plaintiffs seeking to enforce § 1623 against in-state
tuition rates face an enormous standing hurdle to having the courts fully
address issues of preemption and the enforceability of § 1623.
1. Standing Generally
Federal standing doctrine arises out of the division of powers in Article
III of the Constitution, which limits the federal courts’ jurisdiction to
“Cases” and “Controversies.”112 The doctrine of standing serves to identify
those justiciable disputes that can be properly resolved in the courts.113
Standing in federal court requires three elements. First, the plaintiff must
have suffered a concrete injury-in-fact to a legally protected interest;
second, there must be a causal link between the injury and the challenged

107. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 23-7-101 to -111 (2011).
108. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-101-430 (2011).
109. See ALA. CODE § 31-13-8 (LexisNexis 2012).
110. See Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127, 1130 (10th Cir. 2007); Immigration Reform Coal.
of Tex. v. Texas, 706 F. Supp. 2d 760, 762 (S.D. Tex. 2010); Martinez v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855, 860 (Cal. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2961 (2011).
111. See, e.g., Day, 500 F.3d at 1139–40; Immigration Reform Coal. of Tex., 706 F. Supp.
2d at 765; Mannschreck v. Bd. of Regents, No. Ci10-8 (D. Neb. filed Jan. 25, 2010),
dismissed sub nom. Mannschreck v. Clare, No. Ci10-8 (D. Neb. Dec. 17, 2010).
112. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
113. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
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conduct; and third, it must be likely that a favorable decision of the court
can redress the injury.114
2. Standing to Challenge State Legislation Granting In-State Tuition
Benefits to Undocumented Students: Federal vs. State Court
The standing hurdle for plaintiffs challenging state legislation granting
in-state tuition benefits to undocumented students is exemplified in Day,
which challenged Kansas’s statute granting in-state tuition to
undocumented students.115 On July 1, 2004, Kansas enacted Kansas
Statutes Annotated section 76-731a (K.S.A. 76-731a), which classified
eligible undocumented students as residents for the purposes of tuition and
fees.116 U.S. citizen students at Kansas public postsecondary institutions
who were nonresidents of Kansas and parents of those students brought suit
against the Governor of Kansas, the members of the Board of Regents, and
officials of the state’s universities, seeking an injunction against the
enforcement of K.S.A. 76-731a and a declaration that it is preempted by
federal law and unconstitutional.117
Arguing for standing in district court, the plaintiffs asserted that K.S.A.
76-731a caused a number of potential “injuries in fact”: injury to their
property rights as a result of paying out-of-state tuition while
undocumented students were allowed to pay in-state tuition; the resulting
scarcity of college education and increased competition for that resource;
and the increased likelihood that they would bear the burden of higher
tuitions in order to help Kansas state universities subsidize undocumented
students’ tuitions.118 The court, however, held that these arguments were
unfounded and unsupported by any evidence.119 Moreover, the plaintiffs’
unsupported allegations of injury were not “concrete and imminent” enough
to constitute the injury-in-fact required for standing.120 K.S.A. 76-731a
simply did not apply to the plaintiffs, as they would be paying out-of-state
tuition regardless of whether K.S.A. 76-731a had been passed or not.121
The plaintiffs thus stood “in the same shoes as any citizen,” unable to assert
any particularized injury.122 In addition, the court found that striking down
114. See id. at 560–61. See generally ERWIN CHEMERISNKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3
(5th ed. 2007); 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3531–3531.6 (3d ed. 2008).
115. See id. at 1130.
116. See H.B. 2145, 2003–2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2004); see also KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 76-731a (2011).
117. See Day v. Sebelius, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1025–26 (D. Kan. 2005).
118. See id. at 1033.
119. See id.
120. Id. (“Hypothetical or conjectural harm is not sufficient.”).
121. See id.
122. Id. at 1033–34 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1992)
(reaffirming that “a plaintiff . . . claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in
proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and
tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large—does not state an Article III case or
controversy”)).
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K.S.A. 76-731a as preempted by federal law or in violation of federal law
would not redress any alleged injury in a manner that would provide the
plaintiffs with any personal benefit.123
The court also addressed the plaintiffs’ alleged equal protection injury,
based on the argument that K.S.A. 76-731a’s structure discriminatorily
allowed undocumented aliens to receive in-state tuition benefits, while
denying those benefits to out-of-state U.S. citizens.124 The court dismissed
this claim because K.S.A. 76-731a did not deny the plaintiffs in-state
tuition, as it was another unchallenged statute that required out-of-state
citizens to pay out-of-state tuition.125 Because K.S.A. 76-731a did not
apply to the plaintiffs, they could not demonstrate sufficient injury to
establish standing on an equal protection claim.126 The Tenth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s holdings on appeal and, by dismissing on
standing grounds, the circuit court never reached the issue of whether Day
demonstrates that federal courts are unwilling to find that private
individuals have standing to challenge state legislation granting in-state
tuition benefits to undocumented students.127 As a result, plaintiffs
challenging state laws offering in-state tuition rates to undocumented
students appear to prefer to keep their challenges in state courts. In
Immigration Reform Coalition of Texas v. Texas, which challenged a Texas
law granting undocumented students in-state tuition benefits, the defendants
had removed the case to federal court.128 The plaintiff, Immigration
Reform Coalition of Texas (IRCOT), a nonprofit organization comprised of
Texas taxpayers, sought to remand the case to state court based on its lack
of standing in federal court, as federal law does not give plaintiffs standing
to bring cases based solely on their status as taxpayers.129 IRCOT alleged
that it had proper standing in state court, where standing is more
permissive.130 The district court agreed that it had no power to grant
injunctive relief prohibiting state use of tax money to make educational
grants to undocumented students pursuant to state statutes.131 The court
also held that IRCOT lacked constitutional standing to bring preemption
claims against Texas laws defining residency for the purposes of in-state
tuition rates.132 Similar to the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Day, the Southern
123. See id. at 1034.
124. See id. at 1037–38, 1038 n.8.
125. See id. at 1039.
126. See id.
127. See id.; see also Denise Oas, Immigration and Higher Education: The Debate Over
In-State Tuition, 79 UMKC L. REV. 877, 890–92 (2011) (discussing Mannschreck v. Bd. of
Regents, No. Ci10-8 (D. Neb. filed Jan. 25, 2010), dismissed sub nom. Mannschreck v.
Clare, No. Ci10-8 (D. Neb. Dec. 17, 2010), where the district court held that resident
property owners lacked standing to bring preemption claims against the state statute granting
in-state tuition rates to undocumented students).
128. 706 F. Supp. 2d 760, 762 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
129. See id. at 762–63.
130. See id. at 763.
131. See id. at 764–65.
132. See id. at 765.
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District of Texas held that IRCOT alleged no concrete injury-in-fact
resulting from the Texas residency statutes granting undocumented students
in-state tuition rates.133 Thus, because the court found that IRCOT lacked
standing in federal court, the case was remanded to the state court where it
originated.134
Indeed, standing is more permissive in state court, as demonstrated in
Martinez.135 The Martinez plaintiffs brought a preemption claim in state
court against section 68130.5 of the California Education Code,136 which
was enacted in 2001.137 The plaintiffs, who were U.S. citizens paying
nonresident tuition rates at California public colleges and universities, filed
a class action lawsuit against the various governing bodies and officials of
California’s public postsecondary institutions.138 From the start of the
litigation, the California Superior Court held that the plaintiffs’ allegation
that section 68130.5 infringed on their constitutional and statutory rights
was sufficient to establish standing to bring a challenge in state court.139
Moreover, the court held that a private right of action did not need to exist
in § 1621 and § 1623 for the plaintiffs to have standing to bring a
preemption challenge.140 Thus, as § 1621 and § 1623 were intended to
cover the treatment of undocumented immigrants, U.S. citizen plaintiffs had
standing in state court to bring a preemption challenge because section
68130.5 gave undocumented immigrants the right to postsecondary
education benefits.141 The defendants did not challenge the Superior
Court’s holding on the plaintiffs’ standing on appeal.142
Thus, from the limited case law that exists, it appears that plaintiffs
challenging state laws granting in-state tuition rates to undocumented
students must bring their cases in state court, as they will not have standing
to bring their challenges in federal court.
F. Federal Preemption of Laws Relating to Undocumented Immigrants
With standing issues allowing the federal courts to avoid deciding issues
of preemption concerning § 1623, the conflict over whether state laws
granting in-state tuition benefits to undocumented students are preempted
by federal law remains an undecided issue. In order to lay a basis for
understanding how preemption doctrine should apply to state laws granting
in-state tuition benefits to undocumented students, this section discusses
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. 241 P.3d 855 (Cal. 2010).
136. See id. at 859–60.
137. A.B. 540, 2001–2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001).
138. See 241 P.3d at 860.
139. See Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. CV 05-2064, 2006 WL 2974303,
at *5 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 2006).
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 518, 527 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2008).
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preemption doctrine generally, and explores two cases of the Supreme
Court’s application of preemption to state laws affecting aliens in the
United States.
1. Preemption Doctrine Generally
The doctrine of preemption is based in Article VI of the Constitution,
which states that the laws and treaties of the United States “shall be the
supreme law of the land . . . anything in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the contrary notwithstanding.”143 Pure immigration law, defined as
that which relates to “the entry and expulsion of noncitizens and the
conditions under which they may remain,”144 is the exclusive domain of the
federal government.145 Thus, state laws that relate to noncitizens may face
preemption challenges, since “[d]omesticating immigration law . . .
alienates . . . the notion that the Constitution imbues only Congress with
power to conduct foreign affairs.”146 The preemption of state laws turns on
the question of congressional intent, for while “Congress clearly can
preempt state law, federal law can also be ‘supreme’ without state law
being contrary to it, if the federal authority decides that it wants to permit
state laws to continue to operate notwithstanding the federal law.”147
Where there are state laws concerning noncitizens and the regulation of
domestic issues, the three possible bases for preemption are: express
preemption, implied preemption in the form of field preemption, or conflict
preemption.148
Express preemption applies where a statute clearly indicates what state
laws it intends to preempt in an express preemption provision.149 Congress
can also clarify the issue of whether there is express preemption by
including a savings clause that indicates what state laws it does not intend
to preempt.150 It is challenging, however, for Congress to craft a savings
clause that anticipates the full impact a statute will have on state laws, thus
making it difficult to ascertain Congress’s full intent with certain
statutes.151 In such cases, the Supreme Court applies a canon of statutory
interpretation that recognizes a presumption against preemption to preserve
the values of federalism and respect for state laws.152 This presumption

143. U.S. CONST. art. VI; Christopher H. Schroeder, Supreme Court Preemption Doctrine,
in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION
119, 119 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009).
144. Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power Over
Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1600–01 (2008).
145. See supra Part I.A.
146. Stumpf, supra note 144, at 1601.
147. Schroeder, supra note 143, at 120.
148. See Stumpf, supra note 144, at 1601–02.
149. See Schroeder, supra note 143, at 121.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 122.
152. See id. at 122–23 (citing N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654 (1995)).
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remains particularly strong when the state law in question is one that is in
the realm of the states’ traditional powers to protect public health, safety,
and morals.153 Courts therefore tend to read federal statutes narrowly and
look for a clear statement that Congress intended to override state law.154
In cases in which the statute contains no express preemption or savings
clause, the question becomes whether Congress has preempted state law by
implication.155 In an analysis for implied preemption, the touchstone
question is one of congressional intent.156 While it may be difficult to keep
the two categories of implied preemption distinct, implied preemption can
take the form of field preemption or conflict preemption.157
Field preemption applies where the “scheme of federal regulation [is] so
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room
for the States to supplement it.”158 Within these exclusively federal fields
of regulation, state laws would be preempted even if they are not in conflict
with federal laws.159 Defining the “field” that is to be preempted can
depend on the pervasiveness of a federal statute in its regulation of an area,
as a more comprehensive regulatory scheme indicates that Congress likely
did not intend “to leave holes in its regulations to be filled in by the
states.”160 Courts have also found field preemption where there are federal
statutes regulating an area with such a dominating federal interest that the
preclusion of state laws is assumed.161
Conflict preemption applies “when ‘compliance with both federal and
state regulation is a physical impossibility,’ or where state law ‘stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.’”162 Physical impossibility cases demonstrate clear
implied preemption of state laws, as Congress would not enact a law with
the intent that states could prohibit what federal law requires.163 The
analysis for conflict preemption becomes more challenging, however, when
determining whether a state law “stands as an obstacle” to the objectives of

153. See Schroeder, supra note 143, at 123 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,
485 (1996)).
154. See id.
155. See id. at 124.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 125.
158. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S.
190, 204 (1983) (citations omitted).
159. See Schroeder, supra note 143, at 125–26.
160. Id. at 127.
161. See id. at 128 (citing Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 503 (1956)). As an
example, the Supreme Court struck down a state statute imposing sanctions that
supplemented those implemented by the federal government against a foreign nation, as the
federal government occupies the field of foreign affairs. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade
Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
162. Pac. Gas, 461 U.S. at 204 (citations omitted) (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963), and Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
67 (1941)).
163. See Schroeder, supra note 143, at 131.
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a federal law.164 This obstacle test for preemption appears to rest on
whether the state law would impede the full achievement of Congress’s
purposes and objectives in enacting its statute.165
2. Preemption As Applied in the Immigration Context: De Canas v. Bica
As immigration regulation is understood to be a federal power, the
Supreme Court has faced challenges in applying preemption doctrine to
various state laws affecting aliens.166 In 1976, the Court clarified the extent
to which states have the right to regulate matters concerning unauthorized
Lawfully admitted migrant
immigrants in De Canas v. Bica.167
farmworkers challenged a provision of the California Labor Code that
prohibited an employer from knowingly employing an alien without lawful
residence status if such employment would have an adverse effect on lawful
The Court held that this provision was not
resident workers.168
unconstitutional as a regulation of immigration or preempted by federal
immigration law, and the sole fact that aliens were the subject of the state
statute did not render it a regulation of immigration.169
The challenged provision did not touch issues involving determinations
of who should or should not be admitted into the country, nor did it address
the conditions under which an immigrant may remain.170 Rather, it
reflected California’s use of its state powers to protect workers within the
state.171 The Court held that federal regulation should not be considered
preemptive of state regulatory power unless the nature of the regulated
subject matter so clearly indicates that its regulatory authority rests within
the federal government, or that Congress has unmistakably legislated the
power to the federal government.172
3. Preemption Regarding Higher Education for Nonimmigrant Aliens
Six years later, in Toll v. Moreno,173 the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a state’s denial of in-state tuition to nonimmigrants,
164. Id. at 132–33 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67).
165. See id. at 133.
166. See Schroeder, supra note 143, at 129–30 (describing the Supreme Court’s holdings
that federal law preempted a state law interfering with federal alien registration
requirements, Hines, 312 U.S. 52, as well as a state law denying commercial fishing licenses
to aliens ineligible for citizenship, Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948),
but did not preempt a state law prohibiting undocumented aliens from employment that
would affect resident workers, De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976)).
167. 424 U.S. 351 (1976)
168. See id. at 353; see also CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805, repealed by 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 946,
§ 1.
169. See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355. Legislation with a “purely speculative and indirect
impact on immigration” does not render it an unconstitutional regulation of immigration. Id.
at 355–56.
170. See id. at 355.
171. See id. at 356–57.
172. See id. at 356.
173. 458 U.S. 1 (1982).
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though not in the context of undocumented immigrants. The plaintiffs in
Toll challenged a University of Maryland policy that denied treaty
organization (G-4) aliens in-state tuition pursuant to the University’s policy
of excluding all nonimmigrant aliens from obtaining in-state status even
upon a showing of domicile within the state.174 The plaintiffs contended
that the University’s policy violated various federal laws, as well as
constitutional provisions, including the Supremacy Clause.175 Under a
Supremacy Clause analysis, the Court reiterated that states “can neither add
to nor take from the conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon
admission, naturalization and residence of aliens in the United States or the
several states.”176 This echoed the Court’s reasoning in De Canas,177 and
the Court held that because Congress made the explicit decision to not bar
G-4 aliens from acquiring domicile, the University’s policy of denying instate status to G-4 aliens solely on the basis of their nonimmigrant status
violated the Supremacy Clause by imposing an “ancillary burden not
contemplated by Congress in admitting these aliens” to reside in the United
States.178
II. ARE STATE LAWS PROVIDING POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION BENEFITS
TO UNDOCUMENTED STUDENTS IN THE FORM OF IN-STATE TUITION RATES
PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW?
As the issue of whether federal law preempts state legislation granting instate tuition benefits to undocumented students has not yet been decided by
a federal court, the arguments for and against preemption have been voiced
strongly throughout the several cases challenging such state legislation and
in the ongoing debates over immigration reform. Part II.A explores the
arguments for and against preemption presented in legal scholarship over
state laws providing in-state tuition benefits to undocumented students.
Part II.B examines those arguments made specifically in Day, and Part II.C
looks at those presented in Martinez.
A. Preemption Arguments Made In Legal Scholarship
The arguments made by the leading legal scholars on postsecondary
education benefits for undocumented students are discussed below. This
section first presents the arguments against the preemption of state laws
providing in-state tuition benefits for undocumented students. It then
presents the arguments in favor of preemption.

174. See id. at 3–4.
175. See id. at 4.
176. Id. at 11 (quoting Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948)).
177. See id. at 12–13 (“[S]tate regulation not congressionally sanctioned that
discriminates against aliens lawfully admitted to the country is impermissible if it imposes
additional burdens not contemplated by Congress.” (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S.
351, 358 n.6 (1976))).
178. Id. at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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1. Arguments Against Preemption
Supporters of state statutes providing in-state tuition rate benefits to
undocumented students interpret § 1621 and § 1623 to allow states to
provide undocumented residents with a residency benefit in their public
postsecondary institutions.179 Regarding § 1623, Professor Michael Olivas
argues that state residency is a status to be determined by the states, and that
Congress has no authority to regulate the benefits that states give to their
residents.180
Olivas also argues that states have the right to provide such immigrants
with education benefits because Congress used the word “unless” in
§ 1623.181 The “unless” establishes a condition precedent that a state
cannot give any more consideration to an undocumented student than it can
to a nonresident student from another state.182 A state is therefore allowed
to provide postsecondary education benefits as long as it treats in-state
undocumented immigrants in the same way it treats out-of-state U.S.
citizens. The presence of this condition precedent serves to establish that
states are allowed to enact measures that provide undocumented students
with postsecondary education benefits, because “[a] flat bar [against such
provisions] would not include such a modifier.”183
Lastly, Professor Olivas argues that § 1623 only prohibits providing
monetary benefits, as is indicated by the statute’s use of the words “amount,
duration, and scope” to describe the benefits prohibited.184 As the direct
benefit conferred by state legislation providing undocumented students with
access to in-state tuition rates is not a direct monetary benefit, but the right
to be considered for in-state residency status for the purposes of tuition and
fees, it does not fall under the scope of § 1623’s prohibited benefits.185
This interpretation is further supported by the fact that Congress has
enacted a separate program to limit the availability of monetary
postsecondary education benefits in the form of federal financial aid.186
An additional argument offered by in-state tuition proponents is that
because most state legislation granting in-state tuition to undocumented
179. See Michael A. Olivas, IIRIRA, the DREAM Act, and Undocumented College
Student Residency, 30 J.C. & U.L. 435, 453–54 (2004).
180. See id. at 453.
181. See id.; cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1623 (2006) (“[A]n alien who is not lawfully present in the
United States shall not be eligible on the basis of residence within a State . . . for any
postsecondary education benefit unless a citizen or national of the United States is eligible
for such a benefit . . . .” (emphasis added)).
182. See Olivas, supra note 179, at 453 (“The only way to read this convoluted language
is: State A cannot give any more consideration to an undocumented student than it can give
to a nonresident student from State B. For example, California could not enact a plan to
extend resident status to undocumented students after they had resided in the state for twelve
months, and then accord that same status to U.S. citizens or permanent residents from
Nevada or Oregon after eighteen months.”).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 454.
185. See id.
186. See id.
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students does not hinge eligibility upon residence, but upon other criteria—
such as graduation from a high school in the state—such legislation is not in
violation of § 1623.187
2. Arguments for Preemption
Those who find state provision of in-state tuition rates to undocumented
students to be unconstitutional maintain that the states who do so
“flagrantly violate federal immigration laws,”188 namely § 1623.189 In
addition to making public policy arguments against allowing in-state tuition
rates for undocumented students,190 Professor Kris Kobach argues that such
state legislation is expressly and impliedly preempted by federal law.191
Professor Kobach argues that § 1623 expressly prohibits offering in-state
tuition rates to undocumented students unless all U.S. citizens receive such
rates, thus reflecting Congress’s intent to prohibit states from offering instate tuition rates to undocumented students “by making it impossibly
expensive to do so.”192 Supported by the principle that “the purpose of
Congress is the ultimate touchstone” of preemption analysis,193 Professor
Kobach referred to the Committee Reports on IIRIRA section 505 to
demonstrate Congress’s intent to enact the law to prevent undocumented
students from receiving in-state tuition rates.194 In addition, a holistic view
of IIRIRA and Congress’s manifest intent in enacting the law to discourage
illegal immigration requires interpreting § 1623 as prohibiting in-state
tuition rates for undocumented students in order to be consistent with
IIRIRA’s purpose.195
Professor Kobach also finds state legislation providing in-state tuition
rates to undocumented students impliedly preempted under a De Canas
analysis.196 Pursuant to De Canas, any state law conflicting with
congressional objectives is impliedly preempted by federal law.197
Following this analysis, Professor Kobach proffers three reasons why
federal laws preempt state legislation providing in-state tuition rates to
187. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 15, at 1211.
188. Kris W. Kobach, Immigration Nullification: In-State Tuition and Lawmakers Who
Disregard the Law, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 473, 475 (2007). Professor Kobach
served as Plaintiffs’ counsel in both Day v. Bond, 511 F.3d 1030 (10th Cir. 2007), and
Martinez v. Regents of the University of California, 241 P.3d 855 (Cal. 2010).
189. See Kobach, supra note 188, at 477.
190. See id. at 498–503 (arguing that laws granting in-state tuition rates for
undocumented students are poor public policy because, inter alia, they give a significant
financial benefit to aliens who are in violation of federal law while denying the same
benefits to U.S. citizens who are from out of state, and allowing such rates rewards illegal
behavior).
191. See id. at 475.
192. Id. at 507–08.
193. Id. at 508 (citing Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)).
194. See Kobach, supra note 188, at 508–09.
195. See id. at 511.
196. See id. at 514.
197. See supra notes 167–72 and accompanying text.
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undocumented students.198 First, such legislation conflicts with the
government’s interest in removing the availability of public benefits as an
incentive for illegal immigration.199 Second, such legislation acts as an
obstacle to the enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
by encouraging students to remain in their undocumented status, as many
state statutes are constructed so as to take away the benefit of in-state
tuition rates if undocumented students were to obtain student visas to be in
Lastly, the state statutes
compliance with the federal law.200
unconstitutionally use terms to describe students’ immigration statuses that
are inconsistent with the terminology of federal immigration law.201 State
officials go beyond their powers in using such terms by unconstitutionally
making determinations that are inconsistent with federal law about who is
entitled to be considered lawfully present in the United States.202
Those opposed to providing undocumented students with in-state tuition
benefits therefore find that state legislation doing so is inconsistent with
congressional intent to exclude unlawfully present aliens from
postsecondary education benefits.203 In addition, they argue that § 1621
prohibits residency reclassification for the purposes of providing
undocumented students with in-state tuition rates.204 In response, Professor
Olivas points out that residency reclassification is not listed within the state
or local public benefits enumerated in § 1621(c).205
B. Kansas: Day v. Bond
The arguments of Professors Olivas and Kobach have been made by
parties in cases such as Day.206 As discussed above, the case was
ultimately decided on standing grounds, and neither the district court nor
the Tenth Circuit ever fully addressed the preemption issue.207 In addition,
198. See id.
199. See id. at 515.
200. See id. (explaining that California law is constructed so as to “exclude[] any alien
holding a nonimmigrant visa. . . . Moreover, [an undocumented student] must continue to
remain in the United States and attend university in violation of federal law in order to
receive [in-state tuition rates]. If such an alien leaves the United States, as required by
federal law, he loses eligibility for the benefit. On the other hand, if he obtains a student visa
to attend college in compliance with federal law, he loses eligibility for the benefit.”).
201. See id. at 516.
202. See id.
203. See Memorandum from Alison P. Landry, Assistant Att’y Gen., Va., to INS
Designated Sch. Officials & the Exec. Dir. of the State Council for Higher Educ. in Va. 6–7
(Sept. 5, 2002), available at http://www.schev.edu/AdminFaculty/ImmigrationMemo9-502APL.pdf (providing immigration law compliance update).
204. See Olivas, supra note 179, at 454.
205. See id.
206. 500 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2007).
207. See Day v. Sebelius, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1039 (D. Kan. 2005) (dismissing
Plaintiffs’ equal protection claims for lack of standing, as Plaintiffs were unable to establish
any injury caused by K.S.A. 76-731a since they would have to pay out-of-state tuition
regardless of whether K.S.A. 76-731a was in effect); see also Day v. Bond, 511 F.3d 1030,
1032 (10th Cir. 2007) (affirming the district court’s decision, holding that “[t]he only form

1038

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

the Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari in June 2008.208
However, throughout the course of the litigation, the parties raised the basic
preemption arguments concerning § 1623.
1. Arguments That K.S.A. 76-731a Is Preempted by 8 U.S.C. § 1623
The plaintiffs first argued that § 1623 expressly preempts K.S.A. 76731a, as § 1623’s plain language requires in-state tuition rates to be offered
to U.S. citizens without regard to their residence if such rates are offered to
undocumented students.209 This argument rested upon an interpretation of
§ 1623 that requires all nonresident U.S. citizens to be entitled to the same
benefits as undocumented residents.210 Such an interpretation would be
consistent with Congress’s efforts to deter illegal immigration by enacting
§ 1623,211 and to prevent the states from undermining the enforcement of
federal immigration laws by providing benefits to undocumented
immigrants unlawfully present in the United States.212 The plaintiffs
argued that the title itself of K.S.A. 76-731a—“Certain persons without
lawful immigration status deemed residents for the purpose of tuition and
fees”213—facially violates § 1623 because it extends the in-state tuition
benefit to only undocumented immigrants and excludes U.S. citizens.214 In
addition, the plaintiffs emphasized that because residency laws of the states
operate so that every U.S. citizen is a resident of some state,215 every outof-state U.S. citizen is disqualified for the in-state tuition benefit based on
K.S.A. 76-731a(c)(2)’s requirement that a person not be eligible for in-state
tuition in another state.216 By interpreting § 1623 as an “equal protection”
statute for U.S. citizens seeking favorable tuition rates at public universities
located outside their state of residence, the plaintiffs maintained that § 1623
requires U.S. citizens to be placed on “equal footing” with undocumented
students.217 Following such reasoning, K.S.A. 76-731a unlawfully treats
undocumented immigrants more favorably than citizens in violation of
of injury that the Plaintiffs assert in support of their standing to make this preemption claim
is the invasion of a putative statutory right conferred on them by . . . § 1623.” (quoting Day,
500 F.3d at 1136) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
208. See Day v. Bond, 554 U.S. 918, 918 (2008).
209. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6–7, Day, 554 U.S. 918 (No. 07-1193)
[hereinafter Day Cert. Petition].
210. See id. at 7.
211. Amici Curiae Brief of the Honorable Alan K. Simpson et al. in Support of
Petitioners at 7, Day, 554 U.S. 918 (No. 07-1193) [hereinafter Judge Simpson Brief].
212. See Day Cert. Petition, supra note 209, at 7.
213. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-731a (2011).
214. See Day Cert. Petition, supra note 209, at 8.
215. See Reply Brief of Petitioners at 11, Day, 554 U.S. 918 (No. 07-1193) [hereinafter
Day Petitioners’ Reply Brief].
216. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-731a(c)(2) (“The provisions of this section shall not apply
to any individual who . . . at the time of enrollment, is eligible to enroll in a public
postsecondary educational institution located in another state upon payment of fees and
tuition required of residents of such state.”).
217. Brief of Washington Legal Foundation et al. As Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 21, Day, 554 U.S. 918 (No. 07-1193).
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§ 1623, as an undocumented immigrant cannot be disqualified by the
requirement of ineligibility for resident tuition in another state because he is
ineligible to acquire legal residence in any state.218
The plaintiffs also argued for the implied preemption of K.S.A. 76-731a,
as upholding the state statute would render § 1623 “a dead letter” and defeat
the intent of Congress.219 The plaintiffs maintained that Congress’s intent
in enacting § 1623 was to allow U.S. citizen students to have the same
rights to any educational benefits offered to undocumented students.220 In
support of this proposition was the argument that Congress’s multiple failed
attempts to pass the DREAM Act, which would have repealed § 1623 and
granted undocumented students with postsecondary education benefits,
reflected Congress’s recognition of its intent behind § 1623 to ban state
legislation that granted such benefits.221 However, contrary to this intent,
K.S.A. 76-731a unlawfully allows undocumented students to receive
reduced in-state tuition at taxpayer-funded state colleges.222
2. Arguments That K.S.A. 76-731a Is Not Preempted by 8 U.S.C. § 1623
The defendants argued that K.S.A. 76-731a is not preempted, because
pursuant to § 1621 and § 1623, the in-state tuition benefits are available to
any individual who meets the conditions of K.S.A. 76-731.223 The district
court’s finding that most of those students who have been able to take
advantage of K.S.A. 76-731a are not undocumented immigrant students, but
U.S. citizens who were not residents of Kansas,224 supported the
defendants’ argument that K.S.A. 76-731a does not violate § 1623 because
its in-state tuition benefit is not limited to undocumented immigrants.
Moreover, the defendants argued that K.S.A. 76-731a also adheres to
§ 1621(d) by affirmatively stating Kansas’s intent to make undocumented
students among its beneficiaries.225
C. California: Martinez v. Regents of the University of California
While K.S.A. 76-731a explicitly states that undocumented students are
eligible for in-state tuition rates as residents of Kansas for the purposes of
tuition and fees, section 68130.5 of the California Education Code does not
218. See Day Petitioners’ Reply Brief, supra note 215, at 11.
219. Day Cert. Petition, supra note 209, at 34–36.
220. See id. at 35.
221. See Judge Simpson Brief, supra note 211, at 7.
222. See Day Cert. Petition, supra note 209, at 35.
223. See Brief in Opposition 4–5, Day, 554 U.S. 918 (No. 07-1193) [hereinafter Day
Respondents’ Brief]. The conditions as set forth in K.S.A. 76-731 are: attending Kansas
high school for at least three years; graduating from a Kansas high school or obtaining a
Kansas GED; signing an affidavit regarding the legalization of the student’s immigration
status; not holding a valid student visa; and ineligibility for resident tuition at any other
state’s postsecondary schools. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-731a (2011).
224. See Day v. Sebelius, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1033 (D. Kan. 2005).
225. See Day Respondents’ Brief, supra note 223, at 5; see also supra note 87 and
accompanying text.
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make such express statements about being considered a resident for tuition
purposes.226 It simply bases an undocumented student’s eligibility on
meeting the requirements of attending a California high school for three or
more years; graduating from a California high school; enrolling at a
California public college or university; and, in the case of a student without
lawful immigration status, filing an affidavit with the institution of higher
education stating that the student has filed or will file an application to
legalize his or her immigration status.227
The central issue in the Martinez revolved around whether § 1623 should
be interpreted as barring state laws that grant in-state tuition literally “on
the basis of residence,” or whether “on the basis of residence” is merely a
term used to describe the kinds of benefits typically given on the basis of
residence, which Congress sought to bar.228 In the latter case, section
68130.5 would be preempted by federal law from granting in-state tuition
benefits to undocumented students, even if eligibility is based on factors not
explicitly residence-based, such as an undocumented student’s attendance at
and graduation from a California high school.
1. Arguments That Section 68130.5 of the California Education Code Is
Preempted by 8 U.S.C. § 1623
The Martinez plaintiffs argued that section 68130.5 is expressly
preempted by § 1623, as Congress intended § 1623 to prevent states from
providing in-state tuition rates as a resident benefit to undocumented
immigrants.229 The plaintiffs argued that section 68130.5 violates § 1623
by conferring a benefit on the basis of “de facto residence
requirement[s]”230 without giving the same benefit to every U.S. citizen.231
The plaintiffs maintained that the graduation requirement is a de facto
residence requirement, because “[a] reasonable person would assume that a
person attending a California high school for three years also lives in
California. Such an assumption would be reasonable, given that a school
district is generally linked to residence.”232 In addition, the three-year
California high school attendance requirement similarly created a
“surrogate criterion for residence.”233
The plaintiffs relied heavily on the legislative history behind § 1623 to
argue for express preemption, as legislative intent can inform statutory

226. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
227. See id.
228. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
131 S. Ct. 2961 (2011) (No. 10-1029) [hereinafter Martinez Cert. Petition].
229. See id. at 17.
230. Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 518, 537 (Cal. Ct. App.
2008).
231. See Martinez Cert. Petition, supra note 228, at 11.
232. Martinez, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 535.
233. Id. at 537.
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interpretation where a statute is unclear.234 Because § 1623 was enacted as
a part of IIRIRA, the plaintiffs emphasized that IIRIRA was enacted to
preclude undocumented immigrants from public benefits, including
postsecondary education benefits.235 Moreover, this legislation came six
weeks after PRWORA was enacted for the purpose of removing the
incentive for illegal immigration provided by the availability of public
benefits.236 Congress’s intent behind PRWORA and IIRIRA support the
idea that it sought to make it practically impossible for states to grant instate tuition to undocumented students.237 In fact, the Congressional
Committee Report describes IIRIRA section 505 as “provid[ing] that illegal
aliens are not eligible for in-state tuition rates at public institutions of higher
education.”238 Statements from members of Congress reflect their support
for IIRIRA section 505 as a measure to deny undocumented immigrants instate tuition.239
The preemption of section 68130.5 is further supported by the argument
that the California state legislature cannot evade or circumvent § 1623
preemption by making the in-state tuition benefit available to only some
and not all U.S. citizens without regard to their state of residence.240
According to the Martinez plaintiffs, section 68130.5 unlawfully excludes
the “vast majority” of nonresident U.S. citizens who do not attend or
graduate from a California high school, and thus do not qualify for reduced
tuition.241 The plaintiffs also argued that Congress did not intend to create
a “loophole” that would allow states to play “semantic games” and avoid
granting undocumented students residence-based benefits by using
“surrogate criterion,” such as graduation from a state high school.242 The
plaintiffs additionally argued that section 68130.5 is preempted by § 1621,
which expressly prohibits public benefits for illegal aliens unless a state
enacts a statute affirmatively providing eligibility for undocumented
immigrants.243
234. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 508–09 (1989) (“Concluding
that the text is ambiguous . . . , we then seek guidance from legislative history . . . .”).
235. See Martinez Cert. Petition, supra note 228, at 19–20.
236. See id. at 18–19; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1601(6) (2006) (“It is a compelling government
interest to remove the incentive for illegal immigration provided by the availability of public
benefits.”).
237. See Martinez Cert. Petition, supra note 228, at 20.
238. Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 240 (1996).
239. See Martinez Cert. Petition, supra note 228, at 20–22; see also 142 CONG. REC.
26438 (1996) (statement of Sen. Alan Simpson) (recording Simpson, the principal sponsor of
the Senate bill, as stating, “Illegal aliens will no longer be eligible for reduced in-State
college tuition.”); 142 CONG. REC. 25264 (1996) (statement of Rep. Christopher Cox)
(“[I]llegal aliens, unless we pass this bill, are going to get in-State tuition.”).
240. See Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 518, 540–41 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2008).
241. Brief of U.S. Reps. Lamar Smith et al. As Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at
16, Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 131 S. Ct. 2961 (2011) (No. 10-1029)
[hereinafter Rep. Smith Brief].
242. Martinez Cert. Petition, supra note 228, at 22–24.
243. See Martinez, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 543–44.
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As the plaintiffs’ express preemption argument was based primarily upon
congressional intent, rather than any express provisions of federal law, they
also argued that the lack of express preemption does not mean that implied
preemption does not exist.244 In arguing for field preemption, the plaintiffs
asserted that Congress manifested its clear purpose to oust state power in
the field of regulating postsecondary education benefits available to
undocumented students.245 The plaintiffs’ field preemption argument
rested upon the idea that by enacting § 1623, “Congress . . . expressly
limited the state’s power to give in-state tuition to illegal aliens, and in that
sense Congress manifested a clear purpose to oust state power with respect
to the subject matter which the state statute attempts to regulate.”246
Therefore, while § 1623 does not contain express preemption language, it
impliedly bars section 68130.5 because among its objectives is prohibiting
undocumented immigrants from receiving postsecondary education
benefits.247
The plaintiffs also made a conflict preemption argument, stating that
section 68130.5 stands as an obstacle to Congress’s goal of removing the
It would be impossible for
incentives for illegal immigration.248
undocumented immigrants to take advantage of section 68130.5 and be in
compliance with federal law, as resident tuition rates for undocumented
students would encourage them to remain unlawfully in the United States,
thus conflicting with the anti-illegal immigration objective of § 1623.249 In
addition, it would be impossible for the defendant state university officials
to comply with both section 68130.5 and § 1623, because section 68130.5
grants the in-state tuition benefit to nonresident U.S.citizens only if they
attended a California high school for three years, and thus does not afford
the same benefit to all citizens without regard to residence as required by
§ 1623.250
2. Arguments That Section 68130.5 of the California Education Code Is
Not Preempted by 8 U.S.C. § 1623
While the California Superior Court initially ruled for the defendants on
the preemption issue, holding that neither § 1621 nor § 1623 preempted
section 68130.5,251 on appeal in 2008, the California Court of Appeal
reversed, holding that § 1621 and § 1623 preempted section 68130.5.252
However, the Supreme Court of California reversed the Court of Appeal’s
244. See Petitioners’ Reply Brief at 10–11, Martinez, 131 S. Ct. 2961 (No. 10-1029).
245. See Martinez, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 541.
246. Id. (citing De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976)).
247. See Rep. Smith Brief, supra note 241, at 22.
248. See Martinez Cert. Petition, supra note 228, at 32–33; see also Martinez, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 542 (citing De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976)).
249. See Martinez, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 541.
250. See id.
251. Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. CV 05-2064, 2006 WL 2974303, at *3
(Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 2006).
252. See Martinez, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 540–44.
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decision in 2010, holding that section 68130.5 is not preempted by § 1621
and § 1623.253 The arguments that exist against section 68130.5
preemption were strongly voiced in the California Supreme Court’s
decision.
Addressing the plaintiffs’ express preemption arguments, which had
emphasized Congress’s legislative intent behind § 1623, the court
emphasized that the plain statutory language of § 1623 is controlling in its
interpretation.254 Such unambiguous language cannot be negated by
legislative history.255 Thus, the legislative history behind § 1623, which
contains only remarks by a few members of Congress, cannot negate the
plain language of the statute, particularly where the remarks portray § 1623
as something other than that which is conveyed in its plain and
unambiguous text.256
Following such a principle of statutory interpretation, the California
Supreme Court held that section 68130.5 is not expressly preempted by
§ 1623.257 The plain text of § 1623 shows that Congress did not enact an
absolute bar against providing undocumented immigrants with in-state
tuition rates; rather, § 1623 was drafted as a conditional and qualified
prohibition.258 Congress’s inclusion of the phrase “on the basis of
residence” serves as a limit on the reach of § 1623’s prohibition on
providing benefits to undocumented immigrants.259 Had Congress intended
to create an absolute ban on postsecondary education benefits for
undocumented immigrants, it could have easily crafted § 1623 to be one.260
Thus, to read the statute as an absolute bar would render “on the basis of
residence” superfluous.261
The court held that section 68130.5 does not confer eligibility on the
basis of residence, but bases eligibility on other criteria,262 such as having
attended high school in California for at least three years and having
graduated from a California high school.263 Such criteria cannot be
253. See Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855 (Cal. 2010).
254. Id. at 863–64.
255. Id. at 865–66 (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546,
568 (2005) (“[T]he authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or
any other extrinsic material. Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only
to the extent that they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s understanding of
otherwise ambiguous terms.”)).
256. See Brief in Opposition at 34, Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 131 S. Ct.
2961 (2011) (No. 10-1029) [hereinafter Martinez Respondents’ Brief]; id. at 35 (quoting
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 457 (2002) (“Floor statements from two
Senators cannot amend the clear and unambiguous language of a statute. We see no reason
to give greater weight to the views of two Senators than to the collective votes of both
Houses, which are memorialized in the unambiguous statutory text.”)).
257. See Martinez, 241 P.3d at 863.
258. See Martinez Respondents’ Brief, supra note 256, at 31.
259. See Martinez, 241 P.3d at 864.
260. See id.
261. See Martinez Respondents’ Brief, supra note 256, at 33.
262. See Martinez, 241 P.3d at 860.
263. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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considered “de facto” residence criteria due to the fact that there are several
categories of nonresident students who are not undocumented immigrants
also qualifying for in-state tuition rates.264 For example, students living in
an adjoining state or country who are permitted to attend high school in
California; the children of parents living outside California, who attend
boarding schools or high schools in California; and those who attended high
school in California for three years, but moved out of the state and lost
residency status, but decide to attend a California public college or
university are all eligible for in-state tuition rates under section 68130.5.265
The court also held that there was no implied preemption of section
68130.5.266 In rejecting the plaintiffs’ field preemption argument, the court
recognized that immigration power is within the exclusive realm of the
federal government, but that not all state legislation affecting noncitizens is
preempted by federal law.267
In deciding Martinez, the court determined that, through § 1621 and
§ 1623, Congress defined the reach of federal preemption of state
legislation.268 Those arguing against the preemption of section 68130.5
maintain that § 1623 does not require all U.S. citizens to receive the same
benefits as those granted to undocumented immigrants; it only requires that
citizens also be given the opportunity to be considered for such a benefit.269
The court found that requiring the benefits to extend to all U.S. citizens
would be an oversimplification of the statutory language of § 1623.270
Moreover, the defendants asserted that section 68130.5 is not preempted
because § 1621(d) expressly authorizes states to provide public benefits for
undocumented immigrants if it does so in compliance with § 1621(d)’s
requirements,271 which include affirmatively providing undocumented
immigrants with eligibility for in-state tuition benefits.272 The fact that
such express authorization exists in the federal law therefore shows that
Congress did not intend to fully occupy the field regulating benefits to
undocumented immigrants.273 In compliance with § 1621(d), the California
state legislature enacted section 68130.5 by affirmatively stating that “[t]his
act . . . allows all persons, including undocumented immigrant students who
meet the requirements . . . to be exempt from non-resident tuition in
California’s colleges and universities.”274 Therefore, section 68130.5 does
264. See Martinez, 241 P.3d at 864.
265. See id.
266. See id. at 868.
267. See id. at 861 (citing De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976)).
268. See id. at 868.
269. See Brief of Respondents the Board of Governors of the California Community.
Colleges and Marshall Drummond in Opposition at 19, Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 131 S. Ct. 2961 (2011) (No. 10-1029).
270. See Martinez, 241 P.3d at 865.
271. See Martinez Respondents’ Brief, supra note 256, at 23.
272. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
273. See Martinez Respondents’ Brief, supra note 256, at 23.
274. Martinez, 241 P.3d at 866–67 (quoting A.B. 540, 2001–2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2001)).
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not fall within the scope of preemption by federal law because it complies
with the conditions set forth in both § 1621 and § 1623.275
In accordance with these arguments, the California Supreme Court held
there was no preemption of section 68130.5.276 However, because the U.S.
Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari for Martinez in June
2011,277 the issue of whether state legislation providing in-state tuition
benefits to undocumented students is preempted by federal immigration law
remains an undecided question.
III. STATES CAN PROPERLY CRAFT LEGISLATION GRANTING
UNDOCUMENTED STUDENTS IN-STATE TUITION RATES IN
COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL LAW
Strong arguments exist on both sides of the debate over whether federal
law preempts states from passing legislation that provides postsecondary
education benefits in the form of in-state tuition rates to undocumented
students. Part III of this Note argues, however, that proper statutory
interpretation of § 1621 and § 1623 and standard preemption analysis
indicate that states can provide in-state tuition rates to undocumented
students. Properly crafted legislation does not face express preemption,
field preemption, or conflict preemption by § 1623, as discussed in Parts
III.A, III.B, and III.C, respectively. Nonetheless, while the states are able to
provide in-state tuition rates to undocumented students, Part III.D argues
that the best solution to resolving the conflicting views on in-state tuition
rates for undocumented students would be through federal legislation
repealing § 1623 and granting deserving undocumented students a pathway
to lawful immigration status and higher education.
A. In-State Tuition Rates for Undocumented Students Are Not Expressly
Preempted by § 1623
Section 1623 states that “an alien who is not lawfully present in the
United States shall not be eligible on the basis of residence within a State
. . . for any postsecondary education benefit unless a citizen or national of
the United States is eligible for such a benefit . . . .”278 Thus, the statute
sets forth two conditions to be met by states legislating to provide in-state
tuition rates for undocumented students: first, the benefit cannot be based
on residence within a state;279 and second, nonresident citizens must not be
any less entitled to the benefit than undocumented students.280 State
legislation that meets these two requirements is therefore not expressly
preempted by § 1623.281
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

See id. at 868.
See id. at 869.
See Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 131 S. Ct. 2961 (2011).
8 U.S.C. § 1623 (2006) (emphasis added).
See supra notes 258–59 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 181–82 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 149–54 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, § 1623 cannot be viewed as an absolute bar against providing
undocumented students with postsecondary education benefits. The
legislative history behind § 1623, which contains only a few congressional
remarks to indicate an intent to create a blanket prohibition against
postsecondary education benefits, cannot negate the plain and unambiguous
language of the statute.282 Section 1623 was drafted as a conditional and
qualified prohibition, not an absolute one.283 Congress’s use of the phrase
“on the basis of residence” serves as a limit on the reach of § 1623’s
prohibition on providing benefits to undocumented immigrants,284 and to
read the statute as an absolute bar would render “on the basis of residence”
meaningless surplus language in the statute.285 Had Congress intended to
create an absolute ban on postsecondary education benefits for
undocumented immigrants, it could have easily crafted § 1623 to be one.286
Furthermore, the condition established by the “unless” in the statutory
language further supports a conclusion that states can offer in-state tuition
benefits to undocumented students.287 The “unless” establishes the
condition that a state cannot give any more consideration to an
undocumented student than it can to a nonresident student from another
state.288 This condition further proves that states are allowed to enact
measures that provide undocumented students with postsecondary
education benefits, as such a modifier would not be necessary had Congress
intended to enact a flat bar against providing postsecondary education
benefits.289
As most state legislation granting in-state tuition to undocumented
students does not rest eligibility upon residence within a state, but upon
other criteria, such as graduation from a high school within the state, such
legislation is not in violation of § 1623.290 For example, K.S.A. 76-731a is
not preempted by § 1623 because the in-state tuition benefits are available
to any individuals—not just undocumented students—who meet the
conditions of the statute, which are not expressly based upon residence.291
Section 68130.5 of the California Education Code also does not confer
eligibility on the basis of residence, but bases eligibility on other criteria,
including graduation from a California high school, which apply to all
individuals seeking the benefit.292 Both the Kansas and California statutes
are therefore in compliance with the two conditions set forth in § 1623 and
lawfully provide undocumented students with in-state tuition rate benefits.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

See supra notes 255–56 and accompanying text.
See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 223–24 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 262–65 and accompanying text.
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B. The Ability of States to Provide In-State Tuition Rates to Undocumented
Students Is Not Field Preempted
States are not field preempted from providing postsecondary education
benefits to undocumented students simply because the undocumented are
noncitizens.293 While power to regulate immigration is within the exclusive
realm of the federal government,294 not all state regulations affecting
noncitizens are regulations of immigration.295 Federal law does not state
law unless either the nature of the regulated subject matter so clearly
indicates that authority over it rests with the federal government, or
Congress has unmistakably given the power to the federal government.296
As held in both De Canas and Toll, state regulations affecting noncitizens
will be upheld as within the realm of state regulatory authority, so long as
they do not add to or take away from the conditions Congress has decided
to place upon the admission, naturalization, and residence of noncitizens in
the United States.297 Thus, to enact valid legislation, states must simply
comply with the plain and unambiguous language of § 1623, which set forth
the conditions that define the reach of the preempted field of state
legislation providing postsecondary education benefits to undocumented
students.298 Those conditions do not require all U.S. citizens to receive the
same benefits as those granted to undocumented immigrants, but only that
citizens be given the same opportunity to be considered for such a
benefit.299 Therefore, state statutes that are in compliance with § 1623,
such as those in Kansas and California, are not field preempted by federal
law because they do not add to or take away from the conditions imposed
by Congress.300
C. The Ability of States to Provide In-State Tuition Rates to Undocumented
Students Is Not Conflict Preempted
Opponents of in-state tuition for undocumented students argue that states
providing the benefit face conflict preemption.301 However, the argument
that providing in-state tuition to undocumented students would stand as an
obstacle to Congress fulfilling the objectives of PRWORA and IIRIRA to
disincentivize illegal immigration is weak.302 The undocumented children
who would gain from postsecondary education benefits form only a small
percentage of the undocumented immigrant population in the United
States.303 In addition, state provision of in-state tuition rates to the
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

See supra notes 158–65 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 169–70 and accompanying text.
See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 167–78 and accompanying text.
See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 162–65 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 31–33, 36, 235–39 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 38, 42–43 and accompanying text.
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relatively small population of undocumented students cannot be considered
an obstacle to Congress’s objectives in PRWORA and IIRIRA, as they
were overall unsuccessful pieces of legislation that were not able to deter
illegal immigration.304 Moreover, § 1623, which was enacted as a part of
IIRIRA, indicates that in-state tuition is a permitted benefit so long as it is
not based on residence.305 Therefore, conflict preemption cannot exist
where state legislation granting in-state tuition to undocumented students is
in compliance with the measures set forth by Congress through IIRIRA in
§ 1623.
D. Judicial Deference and the Need for a Legislative Solution
Because the California Supreme Court is the only court to have thus far
decided the § 1623 preemption issue,306 the lawfulness of state statutes
offering in-state tuition rates to undocumented students remains unclear.
Further delaying resolution of the issue is the fact that federal courts have
held that plaintiffs have no standing to bring preemption claims, effectively
destroyed the ability of private individuals to bring enforcement actions
under § 1623 in federal court.307 The apparent reluctance of federal courts
to address the issue likely reflects the judiciary’s traditional deference to the
other branches of government in immigration regulation.308
The difficulty of resolving the § 1623 preemption issue is also
compounded by the fact that, in addition to the courts’ deferential avoidance
of the issue, the federal government has not taken any action to enforce
§ 1623 against state laws granting in-state tuition benefits.309 The U.S.
Department of Homeland Security is responsible for enforcing federal
immigration laws, yet has failed even to respond to complaints alleging that
state laws violated IIRIRA’s provisions against postsecondary education
benefits.310 Due to the federal government’s inaction in enforcing § 1623
and the federal courts’ reluctance to decide the issue of whether states can
lawfully provide in-state tuition benefits to undocumented students, the
justiciability of the issue remains at a standstill and the best hope for a
resolution rests with Congress.
Legislative responses to the issue include Congress’s attempts to pass the
DREAM Act, which would repeal § 1623.311 Part of the difficulty in
passing the DREAM Act lies in the fact that immigration law reform today
is no longer approached through piecemeal efforts in Congress, but through
304. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
305. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
306. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 131–34 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 266–67 and accompanying text.
309. See Martinez Respondents’ Brief, supra note 256, at 27–28.
310. See Oas, supra note 127, at 892 (noting that the DHS has not responded to the
complaint filed in 2005 by the legal advocacy group, the Washington Legal Foundation,
arguing that New York’s and Texas’s statues granting in-state tuition benefits to
undocumented students violated IIRIRA).
311. See supra notes 68–79 and accompanying text.
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an omnibus strategy due to the “transcendent complexity [of immigration
reform], with so many interrelated moving parts, that [immigration law]
cannot be incrementally reformed.”312 Thus, the hopes for reforming
policies regarding postsecondary education opportunities for undocumented
students are inextricably tied to other immigration reform issues, such as
employment and border security.313
As a matter of fairness and good policy, Congress should continue to
place full efforts behind passing legislation that recognizes the value of
providing postsecondary education opportunities for those long-term
undocumented students who received much of their basic education in the
United States, as they are entitled to under Plyler v. Doe.314 Though Plyler
does not give undocumented students the right to a postsecondary
education, there is an inherent unfairness in denying undocumented
students the opportunity to pursue those dreams of higher education that
were nurtured through the basic education they received in the United
States. The feelings of disentitlement and helplessness that develop in
undocumented children as a result of the insurmountable barriers to higher
education surely resonate with the feelings of inferiority that the Court
sought to prevent in Brown v. Board of Education.315
Restricting the postsecondary education opportunities of undocumented
students also prevents the federal and state governments from reaping
economic benefits that were cultivated in these young adults.316 The states
have already invested in undocumented children by providing them with a
basic education. Allowing these children to earn their postsecondary
degrees, and thus secure better job opportunities, would mean that they
could earn higher salaries and make higher tax contributions as adults.317
For the benefit of undocumented children, the states, and the nation as a
whole, Congress needs to pass legislation that supports deserving
undocumented students seeking a higher education. Until Congress offers
these students a pathway to lawful immigration status and gives the states
back their authority to regulate their postsecondary education benefits by
repealing § 1623, countless undocumented students will remain prisoners of
an immigration status that they acquired by no fault of their own.
CONCLUSION
Many undocumented young adults who have grown up as productive
members of American society discover only at the footsteps of receiving a
higher education that their dreams are barred by an unlawful immigration
312. Olivas, supra note 10, at 1800–02, 1804.
313. See id. at 1800–02.
314. See supra notes 57–67 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
316. Youngro Lee, Note, To Dream or Not to Dream: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the
Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, 16 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 231, 247–48 (2006).
317. Id. at 248.
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status due to no fault of their own. The ultimate solution to this injustice is
federal legislation opening up a path for deserving undocumented students
to obtain lawful immigration status and the opportunity for higher
education. Unfortunately, it is unclear whether Congress will pass such
legislation.
Though an incomplete solution, state legislation granting undocumented
students in-state tuition rates can help alleviate these students’ fears of
being unable to pursue their goals and help them to remain productive
members of society. Having already invested in these young adults with
primary and secondary education, states should recognize the potential for
these undocumented students to contribute to society. Thus, out of both
pragmatism and compassion, states should offer their undocumented
students in-state tuition rates according to terms that are carefully crafted to
comply with § 1621 and § 1623.

